Summary: This paper describes the U.S. financial system's response to the destruction caused by Hurricane Katrina and examines how financial safety nets helped meet consumers' needs in the aftermath of the storm. Overall, we find that consumers who hold deposit accounts at financial institutions are less vulnerable to financial disruptions than individuals who do not have either a checking or a savings account (the unbanked). The federal banking regulators' and financial institutions' responses to Hurricane Katrina, the financial vulnerability of unbanked families to this unexpected catastrophic event, and how the American Red Cross, FEMA, and the Gulf States' relief efforts supplied financial assistance to Katrina's victims are also addressed. Finally, we present several strategies that can be pursued to further safeguard the U.S. population and the financial community against extraordinary events.
Over the years, regulators and financial institutions have worked to establish and maintain back-up systems and contingency plans that have proven invaluable to ensuring the stability of the U.S. financial system, particularly regional financial markets, following an extraordinary event, such as the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and, more recently, Hurricane Katrina. Many of the lessons learned by the financial community as a result of the 2001 terrorist attacks were incorporated into regulators' and financial institutions' process of updating and further strengthening contingency and disaster recovery plans. 4 They also led to revised guidance and examination procedures for business continuity planning.
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These efforts by regulators meant that financial infrastructures and information technology systems were strengthened, extensive protocols were put into place, and back-up communications networks were built to safeguard against manmade and natural disasters. As a result, the U.S. financial system has extensive and well-communicated safeguards to help the financial industry and its regulators quickly restore financial services and liquidity to regions devastated by extraordinary events. The contingency and disaster recovery plans established by the Federal Reserve and regional financial institutions were activated during Hurricane Katrina.
This paper describes the U.S. financial system's response to the destruction caused by Hurricane Katrina and examines how financial safety nets helped meet consumers' needs in the aftermath of the storm. Overall, we find that consumers who hold deposit accounts at financial institutions are less vulnerable to financial disruptions than individuals who do not have either a checking or a savings account (the unbanked). Section 2 describes the response to Hurricane
Katrina by federal banking regulators and financial institutions, and section 3 discusses unbanked families' financial vulnerability to this catastrophic event. Section 4 outlines how the American Red Cross, FEMA, and the Gulf States' relief agencies supplied financial assistance to Katrina's victims. In section 5, we describe some of the unique challenges and potential benefits of using pre-funded payment cards by relief organizations and government agencies. The final section proposes strategies -a number of which were raised during our discussions with leaders in the financial services industry -that can be pursued to further safeguard the U.S. population and the financial community against extraordinary events.
Response by Financial Regulators and Institutions
Federal bank, thrift, and credit union regulatory agencies 6 (the agencies) responded to the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina by taking immediate steps to ensure that the market had sufficient liquidity to meet consumers' and businesses' demands for cash in the absence of alternative electronic payment options. Similarly, on September 7, the NCUA reported that the storm had affected 139 credit unions with a total of $3.4 billion in assets. Of these, 32 were nonoperational, representing less than 10 percent of the total assets. By September 16, the NCUA reported that all credit unions were operational and providing their members with access to their funds.
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While many financial institutions' locations were back in operation within days of the hurricane, there were also a significant number in hard hit areas that had been destroyed by the The agencies also noted that BSA regulations require financial institutions to obtain certain customer information prior to opening a new account: name, address, date of birth, and taxpayer identification number. 18 The regulations do not, however, require a financial institution 16 18 For most people, the taxpayer identification number is their Social Security number.
to verify a customer's identity prior to opening an account but, rather, within a "reasonable time"
following the account opening. 19 Therefore, banks were granted flexibility under the statute to define a "reasonable time," given the post-hurricane circumstances. However, simply cashing noncustomers' checks is not considered "opening an account," and financial institutions had discretion regarding the extent to which they provided this service to noncustomers and which documents they would require. Moreover, financial institutions receiving wire transfers under $3,000 for noncustomers are not required by law to verify the recipient's identity, although many choose to do so as part of their standard practices. Alternatively, for amounts greater than $3,000, the agencies noted that financial institutions should "obtain and retain the name of the beneficiary, address, type of identification document reviewed and number of identification document, and taxpayer identification number."
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The federal regulatory agencies' responses and the contingency and disaster recovery plans put in place by financial institutions were effective in many ways. 21 Cash was being moved to the affected areas, regulatory agencies were encouraging institutions to relax rules about servicing noncustomers, and many forms of financial relief were being provided to the region's residents. Additionally, a large majority of financial institutions had successfully shifted data systems and clearing and settlement operations to alternative locations. As a result of these financial safety nets, Gulf Coast residents who had formal banking relationships were able to immediately benefit from the practices instituted by the agencies and financial institutions. neighborhood. 22 An important question that arises is how unbanked families from the New Orleans inner city and the surrounding region were able to cope in the aftermath of Katrina. The financial circumstances and subsequent relief efforts provided to unbanked families is described in the next section.
Financial Vulnerability of Unbanked Families
Insights about the circumstances faced by families most vulnerable to the impact of Katrina are provided in a survey of evacuees in the Houston Astrodome shelter conducted by the Washington Post, Kaiser Family Foundation, and Harvard University (WKH). 23 Ninety-eight percent of those surveyed were from the greater New Orleans area. According to the survey, the majority of these evacuees were unbanked, had lower annual income, and were members of a minority group. Specifically, 74 percent reported a total before-tax income last year of less than $30,000. 24 Almost two-thirds of the respondents were unbanked, 95 percent were members of a minority group (of which 93 percent were black), and 72 percent did not own credit cards. A majority of these evacuees said they had remained in the hurricane region either because they It is fairly common for unbanked or lower-income persons to obtain check cashing and other financial services from alternative providers of financial services, e.g., check cashers, money transmitters, and payday lenders, 26 among others. 27 These companies, however, faced property losses and limited or complete lack of electricity and phone lines, the same as other businesses in the Gulf Coast region. As a consequence, unbanked evacuees' ability to gain access to their funds was severely limited until after they had relocated. Even for the roughly 33 percent of lower-income "banked" evacuees described in the WKH study, any personal budget tightness, possibly coupled with no savings or line of credit to tap into, would have exacerbated their financial circumstances in the hurricane's aftermath. 
Relief Efforts
The These benefits are delivered to families through EBT cards that have been electronically loaded with the appropriate dollar value of benefits. Families make point-of-sale purchases for food and other necessities with EBT cards by electronically accessing the funds using a personal identification number (PIN).
The states of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama used their existing EBT programs to help deliver food and cash assistance to residents of their respective states. 33 In Louisiana, for example, 300,000 EBT food stamp recipients obtained assistance through EBT. An additional 280,000 households in the hurricane region also received food and cash assistance with EBT cards. The USDA allowed a 30-day allotment of food assistance using existing EBT programs.
This time limit was imposed to minimize the potential for fraud. Approximately 977,000
households were certified to receive EBT cards for disaster relief, and certification requirements were less stringent for disaster relief recipients. In particular, they were required only to show 30 For more information on the development of EBT programs and their migration from paper scrip to plastic cards, see "Assessing Cross aid. 35 Alternatively, FEMA's prepaid card program was discontinued after only a few days.
As of September 13, 2005, FEMA had distributed over $819 million in relief funds, of which only $20.6 million were distributed in the form of approximately 10,000 prepaid cards, valued at $2,000 each.
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The increased distribution of prepaid cards by government and relief organizations is an important example not only of the general trend toward electronic payments but also of a lowercost option than cutting and processing checks. Prepaid cards can be a particularly useful way to deliver financial assistance to lower-income and unbanked disaster victims. It also offers recipients a convenient and safe way to meet their financial needs. 37 Although this experience demonstrates that prepaid cards can be deployed for emergency relief, several hurdles must be overcome before greater efficiencies and larger benefits can be gained. 
Delivering Relief via Prepaid Cards: Challenges and Benefits
Structuring an effective emergency relief program using prepaid cards presents a variety of challenges to relief organizations and federal and state agencies. The first is establishing an applicant's eligibility in an emergency. Disaster victims may not have documents available to substantiate their identities or addresses, making it difficult to validate an applicant as a qualified recipient of relief funds. The second is limiting application fraud by screening out ineligible applicants or disallowing eligible recipients to apply more than once, avoiding opportunities for double dipping. Third is restricting card use to pre-approved types of purchases, such as food, clothing, or shelter, and rejecting attempts to purchase nonapproved items. Fourth is determining whether the prepaid card relief program should allow funds to be reloaded to the cards or whether funds should be restricted to the preloaded amount, after which the card becomes defunct. While "reloadability" offers a long-term solution, adding convenience for disaster relief victims and greater distribution efficiencies, it will likely require stronger customer identification protocols in order to limit the potential for illicit use. In disaster areas where residents may not have access to identification documents, reloadable prepaid relief cards may not be a feasible option unless identification requirements can be managed, making limited-use cards more practical. Fifth is the ability to electronically connect to the payment networks for authorizing and settling transactions.
Again, in disaster areas, relying on electronic payments may be difficult when the availability of electricity is spotty or there is damage to ATMs or merchants' point-of-sale card readers. Each of these challenges requires the program's organizers to balance the need to quickly and efficiently get relief funds to those in disaster areas with the ability to do so in ways that control for fraud and other misuse.
38
Despite these challenges, the potential benefits of a prepaid card relief program are many.
Using these cards, organizations can quickly get financial relief into the hands of lower-income 38 For a brief discussion about some of the major advantages and shortcomings associated with using prepaid cards in disaster situations, see At the same time, prepaid card issuers and marketers currently face uncertainties related to the unsettled regulatory environment for prepaid cards. 39 There are a number of prepaid card business models at varying stages of development and consumer acceptance in the market. As a result, regulators have been hesitant to apply uniform regulations to these different types of prepaid card applications because such an action might be costly and might inhibit continued innovation in this emerging payments area. 40 To the extent that regulatory uncertainty hinders continued innovation in this payments category, there is some concern that it may limit the development of prepaid card applications whose functionality is particularly useful in disaster areas and for underserved consumer segments.
Strategies to Further Strengthen Financial Safeguards
The events following Katrina illuminated both strengths and weaknesses of current strategies to safeguard the U.S. population and financial system against natural and manmade disasters. The U.S. financial system has proven to be resilient in providing access to financial services and liquidity to many families and businesses affected by disasters. Even so, additional 39 steps can be taken by the public and financial community to make the recovery from catastrophic events smoother, more efficient, and less stressful for those affected.
A major obstacle faced by many Katrina evacuees was not having adequate documentation of identity or residence. To better prepare for the unexpected, households and business owners should make personal identification, residential information, and banking and other financial documents easily accessible in the event there is a need for quick evacuation. To minimize problems associated with gaining access to personal funds and to ease the burden of transactions, households and business owners can use electronic payments and fund transfers where it makes sense to do so, such as depositing funds directly into an account, making bill payments electronically, and using ATMs to get cash.
Financial educators and counselors can also play an important role in helping consumers understand the costs and benefits associated with the wide variety of financial products and services in the marketplace. In particular, the trend toward electronic payments suggests that consumers would benefit from having a clearer understanding of how electronic fund transfers and payments work, specifically how transactions involving direct deposit, ATM and debit cards, and pre-funded cards are carried out. Financial education is expected to benefit both unbanked and banked persons. As an example, roughly 32 million of the 77 million baby boomers do not use direct deposit for reasons such as do not trust direct deposit, desire to personally make deposits at the financial institution, and have a preference for paper checks. 41 These consumers are more likely to adopt direct deposit if they understand how it works and have greater clarity concerning its safety and ease of use over paper checks.
One of the important lessons learned from Katrina is that individuals who held deposit accounts at financial institutions were less vulnerable to financial disruptions than individuals who were unbanked. Financial educators and counselors can use the Katrina experience to explain the financial soundness of putting funds into a checking or savings account at a financial institution. This experience can also serve to show the advantage of having a financial cushion against unexpected events. For example, evacuees who had savings funds were financially better positioned than individuals who did not when events caused them to have to relocate, find housing, and get another job. In addition, financial educators and counselors can use this event to explain how having a sound credit rating can also help make funds available when disaster strikes.
In the course of researching the financial system's response to Hurricane Katrina and the safety nets in place for disaster-area residents, we spoke to a number of leaders in the financial services industry who represented a cross-section of card issuers, payment processors, and payment consultants. These discussions helped us gain a better understanding of the practical issues faced by private-sector payment providers and brought to light several areas where further study may lead to more effective disaster recovery strategies for the financial services industry.
We summarize several points here. Another point raised by Schnall was that providing credit relief to disaster-area residents in the form of payment deferrals may have an unintended effect: Lenders may defer reporting delinquencies to credit reporting agencies, thereby complicating consumer credit risk analyses. 43 Therefore, lenders may need to consider disaster-area residents' payment performance differently in order to evaluate their repayment ability, for both existing customers and new loan prospects.
A possible consequence of payment deferrals may be that lenders choose not to approve new or existing credit until they feel that this disaster-related effect has been appropriately captured in their lending models. Schnall suggested that lenders and researchers can use the Katrina experience to better understand the implications for consumer credit data and associated longterm consequences related to measuring consumer credit risk in disaster-area lending markets.
Another area noted for further study is a better understanding of the benefits and risks associated with sharing data on evacuees, including updated contact information, with financial institutions. With better access to such information, lenders would be able to initiate contact with relocated customers -instead of waiting for their customers to contact them -in order to speed the cancellation of payment cards lost in the disaster and the delivery of replacement or reissued payment cards to disaster victims at their new addresses. In so doing, lenders are able to limit the potential for fraud related to either lost payment cards or undeliverable reissued cards.
Government and relief agencies can also benefit from access to consolidated data on evacuees in order to facilitate uninterrupted distribution of relief, benefits, and entitlements. 44 Frank D'Angelo of Metavante Corporation pointed out that one way to improve the financial safety net, particularly for the unbanked, lies in better coordination of disaster planning and relief fund distribution among federal and state governments, relief agencies such as FEMA and the Red Cross, and the financial industry. 45 Electronic payment innovations, such as prepaid cards, are emerging as a more efficient way to distribute relief funds to disaster-area residents, although government and relief agencies still face challenges in structuring these programs. As described in Section 5, these challenges can relate to recipient eligibility, purchase authorization, fraud, fund reloadability, and infrastructure concerns. D'Angelo suggested that addressing these challenges and making related decisions about program design and card functionality would benefit from improved dialogue among government agencies and relief organizations that provide financial relief to victims in disaster situations and those in the financial services industry who specialize in issuing cards and processing payments.
Along these same lines, Bob Bucceri, an industry consultant with Chaddsford Planning
Associates, noted that electronic benefit transfer cards worked well as a mechanism to provide disaster relief to Katrina victims because card holders had experience with the program, e.g., EBT card holders; the card issuer or distributor had sufficient resources to provide on-site training to relief recipients; and the infrastructure was sufficiently intact to provide access points for card holders to initiate transactions. 46 He suggested that federal and state governments and relief agencies as well as financial institutions and regulators should evaluate whether their current resources could be harnessed to meet these same criteria when developing strategies to quickly get relief funds to victims of manmade or natural disasters. By doing so, organizations are better positioned to leverage tools already in place to deliver liquidity and payment capabilities to citizens in disaster areas. At the same time, Bucceri stressed that it is critically important to define 45 D'Angelo is president and chief operating officer of Metavante Corporation's Payment Solutions Group. As described on its website, Metavante, a wholly owned subsidiary of Marshall & Illsley Corporation, delivers banking and payment technologies to financial services firms and businesses worldwide. 46 Bucceri is also a chairman emeritus of the Electronic Funds Transfer Association's EBT Industry Council.
who is responsible for mobilizing these tools in an emergency, so that all aspects of a disasterresponse plan can be effectively coordinated.
T. Jack Williams of Tier Technology echoed both D'Angelo's and Bucceri's comments, adding that increased attention should also be paid to converting benefits disbursements such as unemployment, pension, and child support payments from traditional paper checks to an electronic format. 47 He also noted that the distribution process used to execute these disbursements would benefit from standardization of file formats, across various state programs, so that, in emergencies, the process is the same, regardless of which states' residents are affected.
Conclusion
When disasters strike, whether manmade or natural, the financial safety nets work well to stabilize the financial system. At the same time, we find that these safeguards are better able to provide liquidity and relief for consumers who are already part of the financial mainstream than for those who are unbanked and operating outside of formal banking relationships. Strategies for improving the financial safety net have been presented as ways to help minimize the financial disruptions for disaster victims. Several of these strategies hinge on better ways to identify customers, improved coordination between government and relief agencies and the financial services industry, and increased use of electronic payment applications as delivery mechanisms.
At the same time, updating financial education curriculums to reflect lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina is an important step toward improving the public's understanding of the U.S. financial system's response to catastrophic events. Moreover, this education can help consumers make sound financial decisions, possibly encouraging more unbanked to join the financial mainstream and enjoy the benefits afforded by these safety nets. Hurricane Katrina demonstrated that the U.S. payment system's transition from paper-based to electronic formats provides benefits beyond just convenience for consumers. The inherent flexibilities are also 47 Williams is a senior vice president with Tier Technology.
